Abstract. We show that the Lei et al.'s scheme [Information Sciences, 280 (2014), 205-217] fails, because the verifying equation does not hold over the infinite field R. For the field R, the computational errors should be considered seriously. We also remark that the incurred communication cost in the scheme could be overtake the computational gain, which makes it somewhat artificial.
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Verification
Pick an s × 1 random 0/1 vector r.
Check that X(Yr) − Zr ? = (0, · · · , 0) T .
Repeat the process l times.
Output Z.
The correctness of this procedure can be argued as follows. Set the matrixes P 1 , P 2 , P 3 as P 1 (i, j) = α i δ π 1 (i),j , P 2 (i, j) = β i δ π 2 (i),j , P 3 (i, j) = γ i δ π 3 (i),j . Hence,
Then
2 = (α i /β j )X(π 1 (i), π 2 (j)) = X ′ (i, j),
Thus, X(Yr) = Zr.
Unfortunately, the above reasoning process is true only in some symbolic computing environments. But in a practical floating-point number system, computational errors involved in the above procedure should be considered seriously.
3 The checking mechanism in the scheme fails
The checking equation holds only over any finite fields
Suppose that a floating-point number system is characterized by four integers [2] : base χ,
Then its accuracy can be characterized by a quantity known as machine precision, ǫ. If a given real number x is not exactly representable as a floating-point number, then it must be approximated by some "nearby" floating-point number. The process of choosing fl(x) to approximate x is called rounding, and the error introduced by such an approximation is called rounding error.
Consider the simple computation x(y + z). In floating-point arithmetic we have
y ji r i ) = x 11 (y 11 r 1 + y 12 r 2 + · · · + y 1s r s ) +x 12 (y 21 r 1 + y 22 r 2 + · · · + y 2s r s )
. . .
the first entry of Zr is
Since {α 1 , · · · , α m }, {β 1 , · · · , β n } {γ 1 , · · · , γ s } are randomly chosen in R, the total rounding error in the above equation approximates tox 1ȳ1 nsǫ,
, and ǫ is the machine precision. Therefore, the practical computational result is
Thus, the original checking mechanism in the Lei et al.'s scheme fails. The authors did not pay more attentions to the differences between the arithmetic over the infinite field R and that over any finite field.
To fix the scheme, one has to check that
and λ is a fault-tolerant parameter. If all m inequalities are true, then output Z.
The revised version of Lei et al.'s scheme is insecure
Though the computational errors have been considered in the revised version of Lei et al.'s scheme, we show it is insecure because the malicious server can cheat the client to accept a wrong result.
To do this, the malicious server computes Z ′ = X ′ Y ′ and returns Z ′ to the client, where
χ is the base of the underlying floating-point number system. In such case, we have
The probability of the event that
approximates to 1, because n, s are supposed to be sufficiently large. Thus, the malicious server can cheat the client to accept a wrong result Z, where
Further discussions
The authors [1] claim that the proposed scheme is feasible due to there exists a gap between O(mn+ns+ms) and O(mns). Therefore, as long as m, n, s become sufficiently large, the scheme allows the client to outsource the computations to the cloud and gain substantial computational savings.
We now want to stress that the client has to interact with the untrusted cloud via a non authenticated link, by sending X ′ , Y ′ and receiving Z ′ . From the practical point of view, the communication costs (including authentication of the exchanged data, the possible underlying encryption/decryption, the time delay during the interaction, etc.) could be far more than the above computational gain. That means the scheme is somewhat unrealistic.
One might suggest to constrain the Lei et al.'s scheme to some finite fields. But we would like to stress that matrix multiplication computation over finite fields is of little practical importance.
For example, the most popular linear programming cannot be constrained to any finite field.
Conclusion
We 
